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STATUTORY COMMENTS
IMPLIED CIVIL REMEDY FOR VIOLATION OF
SECTION 16(a) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE
ACT OF 1934.
In 1934 Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act' for the avowed
purpose of preventing inequitable and unfair practices in the security
markets. 2 Designed for the protection of innocent purchasers, it prescribes
full and fair disclosure3 enabling the operation of a free and open market
reflecting true evaluations. 4 Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act 5 is
devised to further this basic purpose. Subsection (a)' requires disclosure of
their holdings in the issuer 7 by officers, directors, and beneficial owners of
more than ten percent of any equity security, exposing "insider trading to
'the white glare of publicity.' ,,This is accomplished by requiring an
insider 9 to file a statement of ownership with the Securities and Exchange
Commission and to file a change of ownership statement within ten days
after the close of any calendar month in which a change has occurred. 0 A
problem upon which few courts have passed is whether a civil remedy
should be available to one injured by a violation of the section 16(a) filing
requirements.
'Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1964).
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, preamble, 48 Stat. 881 (1934).
3See Fuller v. Dilbert, 244 F. Supp. 196, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), affd per curiam sub
norm. Righter v. Dilbert, 358 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1966); Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v.
Bankers Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14, 22 (W.D. Ky. 1960), rev'd on othergroundssub nom.
Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunn, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962).
'Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1964).
'Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1964).
'Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1964) provides:
Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more
than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security . . . which is
registered . . . or who is a director or an officer of the issuer of such
security, shall file, at the time of registration. . . or within ten days after
he becomes such beneficial owner, director, or officer, a statement with the
Exchange [and the Commission]. . .of the amount of all equity securities
of such issuer of which he is the beneficial owner, and within ten days after
the close of each calendar month thereafter, if there has been any change in
such ownership during such month . ...
7
"issuer" is used herein to mean the corporation in which a person is an "insider."
'Meeker & Cooney, The Problemof Definition In DeterminingInsider LiabilitiesUnder
Section 16(b), 45 U. VA. L. REV. 949 (1959).
"'Insider" is used herein to mean an officer, director, or beneficial owner of more than
ten percent of any equity security, of a corporation.
"Securities Exchange Act § 16(a).
2
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The case of Grow Chemical Corp. v. Uran" exemplifies the type of
situation in which the question of civil liability arises. There the plaintiff,
Grow Chemical Corporation, desired to obtain a controlling interest in
Guardsman Chemical Coatings, Inc. After checking with the Securities
and Exchange Commission to determine if there were any other ten
percent shareholders who had filed as required by section 16(a), Grow
Chemical purchased a thirteen percent interest in Guardsman, paying a
premium for control. Defendant, Uran, owned more than ten percent of
the outstanding shares but had not filed a section 16(a) statement of
ownership. Plaintiff alleged that as a result of this violation it had been
iiijured, and claimed damages equal to the premium it had paid for
control. In denying defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, the federal district court sustained the availability of a private
12
action for violation of section 16(a).
Unless an injured plaintiff in this type of situation were permitted a
civil action under section 16(a), he might have no other federal remedy.
However, a ieading authority in the field of securities regulation has
stated:
"The
only sanctions
for enforcing
compliance
with § 16(a)-unless the person required to file happens to be an
exchange member or a registered broker-dealer, against whom the
commission might take disciplinary action administratively-are criminal
prosecution and mandatory injunction."' 3 In addition to these two
sanctions, some courts have held that failure to file under section 16(a)
tolls the short, two-year statute of limitations applicable to actions
brought under section 16(b)." The only other section of the Securities
Exchange Act which would possibly be helpful to the injured plaintiff is
section 10(b).' s Under section 10(b) there need be no privity between the
"316 F. Supp. 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
IThe opinion of the court was merely upon the motion to dismiss and did not reach the
question of liability itself.
132L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1039.40 (2d ed. 1961); see Securities Exchange
Act § 32.
"Carr-Consolidated Biscuit Co. v. Moore, 125 F. Supp. 423 (M.D. Pa. 1954);
Grossman v. Young, 72 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78 p(b) (1964) provides:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which
may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by
reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any
purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such
issuer.

. .

within any period of less than six months.

. .

shall inure to and

be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention. . . but no such
suit shall be brought more than two years after the date such profit was
realized. This subsection shall not be construed to cover. . . transactions
which the Commission.

.

. may exempt.

.

..

'"Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1964) provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
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plaintiff and the defendant. t6 Nonetheless, there must have been a
deceptive device or fraud employed in connection with the purchase or sale
of a registered security. 7 Though the requirement is minimal," it would

evidently preclude recovery by an injured party in the position of Grow
Chemical Corporation."9 Therefore if an innocent purchaser is to recover
in a similar situation, it must be in an action under section 16(a).
Since section 16(a) has no express provision for a civil remedy,19 any
private right of action thereunder would have to be implied. The lower
federal courts have developed means for private enforcement of the

Securities Exchange Act 21 to supplement its express provisions for civil
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange. . . any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate
17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5 (1970), promulgated thereunder, provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person...
(c) to engage in any act, practice or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
"in an action under section 10(b), a defrauded seller or purchaser is not limited to an
action against the other party to the transaction. Miller v. Bargain City U.S.A., Inc., 229 F.
Supp. 33, 38 (E.D. Pa. 1964); New Park Mining Co. v. Cramer, 225 F. Supp. 261, 266
(S.D.N.Y. 1963). Privity between plaintiff and defendant is not a condition precedent to
liability, but an evidentiary fact to be considered in determining whether the relationship is
one involving the duty created by statute. Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239
(S.D.N.Y. 1962).
"Securities Exchange Act § 10(b).
I"See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968); Heit v. Weitzen, 402
F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1962).
"Apparently there was no sale or purchase within the meaning of section 10(b) in the
Grow Chemical case. See SEC v. Great Am. Indus., 407 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1968); Greenstein
v. Paul, 400 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1968); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952); cf. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES
REGULATION, CASES AND MATERIALS 866-67 (2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as JENNINGS &
MARSH].

"See Securities Exchange Act § 16(a); 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1039-40
(2d ed. 1961); Poole, CorporateInsiders Face More Regulation, 48 MICH. ST. B.J., Oct.,
1969, at 28, 31.
21
Private rights have been found to exist in: Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944) (for Securities Exchange Act § 6(b)); Osborne v. Mallory,
86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (for Securities Exchange Act § 15); Hawkins v. Merrill,
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner& Beane, 85 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Ark. 1949) (for Securities Exchange
Act §§ 11, 17); Remar v. Clayton Securities Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1949) (for
Securities Exchange Act § 7(c)).

438

WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. XXVIII

liability.2 2 These remedies were based on the general principle of tort law

that the "disregard of the command of a statute is a wrongful act and a
tort." 13 Under this view, the basic requirements for recovery are that the
plaintiff has not conducted himself so as to preclude his recovery; 24 that a
causal connection exists between the violation and the plaintiff's injury;25
and that the purpose of the legislation, at least in part, is to protect a
plaintiff as an individual and the particular interest that has been
26
invaded.
The United States Supreme Court, in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,2 has
also determined that a private action would lie for violation of a section of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.7 However, the Court did not rely
upon general tort theory, but based its decision upon section 27 of the
Act 2 9 and general policy considerations. Section 27 grants the district
courts of the United States jurisdiction "of suits in equity and actions at
law brought to enforce any liability or duty created . . . ,,10
The power
to enforce implies the power to afford an effective remedy and provide a
2E.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1964); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1964). Since some sections of the Act
expressly provided for civil actons a problem arose because of the statutory construction rule
of expressio unus est exclusio alterius. However this has been dealt with "by pointing out
that the sections which contain specific rights of action are '. . . sections [which] deal with
special matters only indirectly germane to the regulation of securities exchanges; they
provide for more unrestricted recovery than would be possible at common law; and they
prescribe narrow statutes of limitations."' Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 632 (9th Cir.
1953), quoting Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 245 (2d Cir. 1944).
"Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
2
'For a plaintiff in the situation of Grow Chemical Corp. to recover, he would have to
satisfy the requirements of the Williams Bill. Note 62 and accompanying text infra.
2
sSee Robinson v. Cupples Container Co., 316 F. Supp. 1362 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Bound
Brook Water Co. v. Jaffe, 284 F. Supp. 702 (D.N.J. 1968).
2

1REsTATEMENT OF TORTS § 286 (1934), as relied on in granting a private right of

action tnder Securities Exchange Act § 10(b) in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F.
Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). See also Crist v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 230 F. Supp. 136 (D.
Colo. 1964), affd 343 F.2d 902 (10th Cir. 1965); Miller v. Bargain City U.S.A., Inc., 229 F.
Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo.
1964); REsTA TEMENT
OF TORTS (Second) §§ 281, 285, 286 (1968); Thayer, Public Wrong

and PrivateAction, 27 HARV. L. Rav. 317, 329-33 (1914).
21377 U.S. 426 (1964).
2The action involved a violation of section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act. See
Comment, Buttrey v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &Smith, Inc.: Implied Civil Liability
For Violation ofStock Exchange Rules, 3 IND. LEGAL F. 555 (1970).
2
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964) provides as follows:
The district courts of the United States . . .shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of violations of this charter or the rules and regulations
thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce
any liability or duty created by this chapter or the rules and regulations
thereunder. (emphasis added)
3115 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964).
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right of recovery. 3' Furthermore it was stated that "it is the duty of the
courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make
effective the congressional purpose.

32

By allowing civil actions and molding remedies to maximize the rights
created under the Securities Exchange Act, the federal courts have poured
3 3
content and substance into otherwise skeletal prohibitions. Yet it
remains uncertain whether or not a civil action will be allowed for
violation of section 16(a).3 Under either the tort theory3 or the theory
used in J.L Case Co. v. Borak,3 ' the question of an implied civil action
under section 16(a) will be determined by the courts' view of the purpose
of that section. It would seem that section 16(a) can properly be viewed
either as part of a comprehensive section to preclude misuse of
information by insiders or as an independent filing provision with its own
3 7
distinct purpose.
If all of section 16 is to be read together, it would be "[f]or the purpose
of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been obtained
by [an insider] by reason of his relationship to the issuer." 3 Section 16(a)
furthers this purpose because "the most potent weapon against the abuse
of inside information is full and prompt disclosure." 3 However, Congress
was not content with disclosure alone40 and enacted section 16(b) which
provides for recovery for the issuer of any profit realized by an insider on a
31
j.l. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). See also Mitchell v. Robert DeMario
Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960); Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S.
110 (1948); Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940).
32377 U.S. at 433. See also Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen &
Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210, 213 (1944); Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173,
176 (1942); Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 201 (1940). The Securities Exchange Act
being broadly remedial, Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943), and for the
protection of investors, Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Va.
1968), implies the availability of judicial relief. W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS 721 (4th ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as CARY].
"See generally Comment, Private Rights and FederalRemedies: Herein ofJ. L Case v.
Borak, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1150 (1965).
34Compare Smith v. Murchison, 310 F. Supp. 1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); General Time
Corp. v. American Investors Funds, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), affdsub nom.
General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026
(1969); Robbins v. Banner Indus., 285 F. Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), with Grow Chemical
Corp. v. Uran, 316 F. Supp. 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Kroese v. Crawford, C.C.H. FED. SEC. L.
REP. T 91,262 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
"Notes 23-26 and accompanying text supra.
3
Notes 27-32 and accompanying text supra.
3See S.E.C., REPORT ON THE SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS pt. III, at 4
(1963); H.R. REP. No. 1333, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7705 (1934); SEA Release No. 4801, 18
Fed. Reg. 1131 (1953); SEA Release No. 8202,32 Fed. Reg. 18063 (1967).
3.Securities Exchange Act § 16(b).
3
'H.R. REP. No. 1333, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 78 CONG. REC. 7705 (1934).
"See 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1040 (2d ed. 1961).
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purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, within six months. 4' Section 16(a)
aids in the recovery of these insider short-swing profits by providing for
disclosure of insider transactions in shares.4 2 Also subsection (b) must be
read together with subsection (a) for definitional clarity. 3 Under this
view, a violation of section 16(a), though not extending the scope of
section 16(b), 44 would extend its statute of limitations. 5
Even considering section 16(a) as part of an integrated statute
designed to curb misuse of inside information, a civil remedy for its
violation may be desirable. By allowing recovery to go to the plaintiff
rather than the issuer, it would avoid the vice of champerty.4 ' In addition,
ah action under section 16(a) would circumvent the strict limitations
contained in 16(b), namely that the security involved be a registered equity
security, that recovery go to the issuer, the six months trading
requirement, the short statute of limitations, and the specific grant of
exemptive power to the Securities and Exchange Commission. 7
Furthermore, the scope of transactions covered by section 16(b) has been
limited. Originally the courts applied an objective test to determine if
section 16(b) applied.' Under this test every profit-making transaction in
4See language of Securities Exchange Act § 16(b), supra note 14.
'2See Poole, supra note 20, at 31.
OPappas v. Moss, 257 F. Supp. 345 (D.N.J. 1966); Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 222 F.
Supp. 831 (D.N.J. 1963), affd, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965). The use of "such beneficial
owner" in section 16(b) clearly refers to "[e]very person who is ... beneficial owner..
in section 16(a).
"It has been held that a failure to file under section 16(a) will not bring within section
16(b) a purchase and sale transaction occurring over a period greater than six months. See
Rogers v. Valentine, 37 F.R.D. 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
"The short two-year statute of limitations in section 16(b) has been held to be
intelligible only in light of the absolute duty to make reports under section 16(a). Thus a
failure to file under section 16(a) tolls the statute of limitation until section 16(a) reports are
filed. A contrary holding would frustrate the will of Congress and non-performance of both
subdivisions of section 16 would be less hazardous than the non-performance of section 16(b)
alone. See Carr-Consolidated Biscuit Co. v. Moore, 125 F. Supp. 423 (M.D. Pa. 1954);
Grossman v. Young, 72 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
"Recovery under section 16(b) goes to the issuer except for allowances of attorney's
fees. See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943). In many instances this is
the sole stimulus for enforcement of section 16(b), and therefore encourages champerty. See
CARY, 812. Achievement of a statutory purpose, only by allowing violation of generally
accepted ethics by attorneys certainly appears undesirable. See 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATION 1053-54 (2d ed. 1961). On the other hand, it does perform a valid function and
it is doubtful whether the SEC could properly supervise and investigate this area. Cary, Book
Review, 75 HARv. L. Rav. 857, 860-61 (1962).
"7Note 6 supra;CARY 826.
4"See, e.g., Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016

(1954); Park &Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761
(1947); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943); Marquette Cement.Mfg.
Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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securities which could fit within the terms of the statute was subject to
section 16(b).4 9 This was done because "the statute was intended to be

thoroughgoing, to squeeze all possible profits out of stock transactions,
and thus to establish a standard so high as to prevent any conflict between
the selfish interest of a fiduciary . . . and the faithful performance of his
duty." 10 However, the recent judicial tendency has been to use a subjective

or pragmatic approach, interpreting section 16(b) in ways most consistent
with the legislative purpose resulting in the narrowing of its scope. ', This
view has some support from the legislative history of section 16(b). 52 In

light of these limitations on section 16(b), perhaps a civil remedy needs to
be implied for violation of section 16(a).
However, the majority of courts which have passed upon the question
have held that no civil action arises for violation of section 16(a).5 In
Robbins v. Banner Industries,5 1the district court viewed section 16 as an
integrated section designed to curb abuses by insiders. The line of cases

allowing a civil remedy under other sections of the Securities Exchange

Act, ' and J. I. Case Co. v. Borak5 ' in particular, were distinguished. In
Borak the private remedy had been developed to effectuate the
Congressional purpose. Since section 16 had a "built-in" private remedy

in subsection (b), the statutory scheme was found to be complete and a
57
private civil remedy unnecessary.
On the other hand, section 16(a) can be read as an independent filing
provision with a distinctive purpose additional to that of preventing
"See Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761
(1947).
-'Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir. 1943).
"'E.g., Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006
(1967); Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967);
Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc., 294 F. Supp. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), affd, 425 F.2d 348 (2d
Cir. 1970). See also CARY 825-827; Lowenfels, Section 16(b): A New Trend in Regulating
Insider Trading, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 45 '(1969); Note, Stock Exchanges Pursuant To
Corporate Consolidation:A Section 16(b) "'Purchaseor Sale"?, 117 U. PA. L. Rav. 1034
(1969). The only recent expansion of coverage under 16(b) has been to allow recovery where a
director purchased while he was a director and sold within six months, but after his
directorship had terminated; and, under a deputization theory to hold a principal liable. See
Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036
(1970); O'Neil, Extension of Liability Under § 16(b)-A Whole New Can of Worms, I1
ARZ. L. REV. 309 (1969).
52
See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934); CARY, 825-27.
5
'General Time Corp. v. American Investors Fund, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 400, 403
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) affd sub nom. General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969); Smith v. Murchison, 310 F. Supp. 1079, 1088
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Robbins v. Banner Indus., 285 F. Supp. 758, 763 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
54285 F. Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
-Cases cited note 21 supra.
5377 U.S. 426 (1964); notes 27-32 and accompanying text supra.
'Robbins v. Banner Indus., 285 F. Supp. 758, 763-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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misuse of inside information. The Securities and Exchange Commission
has stated that a decision5 by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals that a
holder of convertibles did not come within section 16(b) was not, "in light
of the differing purposes of Section 16(a), . . determinative of the
obligation to file ownership reports." 59 Furthermore, it has been held that
section 16(a) establishes reporting standards for insiders, having only
slight significance in assessing liability under section 16(b). 60 It would also
seem that had Congress intended section 16(a) and section 16(b) to be read
for the same purpose, it would have stated its purpose in section 16(a)
rather than in section 16(b).11
It would therefore appear that section 16(a), at least in part, has its
own distinctive purpose. Further evidencing this point is Congress'
passage of the Williams Bill 2 which requires that any person acquiring ten
percent of the shares of a corporation must file with the issuer and the
Commission a statement containing his identity, sources and amount of
financial support, amount of his holdings, any arrangement with third
parties, and plans for alteration of the corporation. 3 One of the reasons
for this enactment was that "[s]ection 16(a) of the Exchange Act .. .
does not fully meet the need of stockholders for information . . .,,"
Presumably then, section 16(a) is partially designed to give information to
shareholders or prospective purchasers relative to control of a corporation
and the extent of that control. If that is one purpose, then the invaded
interest of a plaintiff in the position of Grow Chemical Corporation is an
interest intended to be protected by the statute. Therefore a civil remedy
would properly be implied under either the tort theory"5 or the Borak
rationale" since under either the primary criterion is whether the statute
was designed to protect the interest invaded.
It would seem that a violation of section 16(a) should give rise to a
civil remedy to one injured by reason of its breach. The availability of a
civil action would be a further deterrent to the inimical practices in the
securities industry which the Securities Exchange Act is designed to
8Chemical Fund, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 377 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1967).

51SEA Release No. 8202, 32 Fed. Reg. 18063 (1967). See also JENNINGS

& MARSH

1042.

"Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962, 967 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). It
has been held that section 16(b) cannot be read without reference to section 16(a). See cases
cited note 39 supra. However the converse is not true. Section 16(a) can be read without the
need to refer to section 16(b) for definitional clarity.
"Cf. Robinson v. Difford, 92 F. Supp. 145 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
"Pub. L. No. 90-439, § 2 (July 29, 1968), amending Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1964).
"CARY, 1633-34.
uHearing on H.R. 14475, S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of
the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1968).
"Note 26 and accompanying text supra.
"Notes 27-32 and accompanying text supra.

